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In what sense can monetary policy as currently practiced by the Federal
Reserve (Fed) be characterized as inﬂation targeting? And what, if any, fea-
tures of an inﬂation-targeting policy regime should the Fed adopt more
formally? These are the questions implicit in the title of this paper. U.S.
macroeconomic performance has improved greatly since the early 1980s.
The 1980s and 1990s saw two of the longest expansions in U.S. history and
two of the mildest contractions in 1990–01 and 2001. The paper argues that
this success can be attributed in large part to inﬂation-targeting policy pro-
cedures that the Fed has adopted gradually and implicitly over the last two
decades. Much of the paper is devoted to explaining the origins of the Fed’s
implicit commitment to inﬂation targeting. Understanding the historical
record suggests that some form of inﬂation targeting is likely to remain at
the core of Fed monetary policy indeﬁnitely.
Explicit inﬂation targeting is characterized by the announcement of an
oﬃcial target for the inﬂation rate and by an acknowledgment that low in-
ﬂation is a priority for monetary policy. Inﬂation targeting also involves en-
hanced transparency of the procedures and objectives of monetary policy,
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serve System.and increased accountability of the central bank for attaining those objec-
tives.1
To  a large extent the explicit adoption of inﬂation targeting would
merely continue the approach to monetary policy developed under Chair-
men Volcker and Greenspan. Nevertheless, it seems worthwhile to con-
sider whether more explicit inﬂation-targeting procedures could help the
Fed sustain good monetary policy in the future.2 Detailed, explicit, and
transparent inﬂation-targeting procedures have been adopted by numer-
ous central banks abroad to build and secure credibility for low inﬂation.3
The main objection to some sort of explicit, public commitment to inﬂa-
tion targeting is the concern that inﬂation targeting would focus the Fed
too narrowly on inﬂation at the expense of output and employment. More-
over, the Fed has achieved price stability and arrived at monetary policy
procedures that resemble inﬂation targeting by “just doing it.” So one
might argue that the Fed has little need to adopt inﬂation targeting for-
mally. Admittedly, the priority for low inﬂation is “in the water” at the Fed
these days, but on the other hand “bottling” it for the future might not be
a bad idea.
The Fed has been extraordinarily fortunate in having two remarkable
chairmen since the late 1970s who skillfully helped to turn monetary pol-
icy from a source of instability into a major stabilizing force for the macro-
economy. It is well to remember how uniquely qualiﬁed they were to lead
the Fed. Each had decades of professional experience observing the busi-
ness cycle before becoming chairman—Volcker at the New York Fed and
Greenspan as a private business economist in New York. Each had an ex-
tensive knowledge of ﬁnancial markets and market participants from
having worked in New York (see, e.g., Martin 2000 and Woodward 2000).
Each had prior experience in Washington—Volcker at the Treasury and
Greenspan at the Council of Economic Advisors. And both were trained
economists. Moreover, both men personally experienced and understood
as professionals the disruptive consequences of inﬂation. It will be diﬃcult
to ﬁnd a successor to lead the Fed with all these qualiﬁcations who can nav-
igate the appointments process successfully (see e.g., Stevenson 2002).
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1. See Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and Meyer (2001) for discussions of explicit inﬂation-
targeting policy procedures.
2. Federal Open Market Committee (1995, 1996) contains early debates on inﬂation tar-
geting. Saxton (1997, 2002) makes the case for inﬂation targeting. McCallum (2000) argues
that the United States should formalize its monetary standard by committing to a low long-
run target for inﬂation. A consensus among well-known monetary economists supporting a
priority for low long-run inﬂation is evident in Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (1996).
3. See Bernanke et al. (1999), Blejer et al. (2000), Haldane (1995), King (1997), Kohn
(2000), Liederman and Svensson (1995), Loayza and Soto (2002), McCallum (1997), Neu-
mann and von Hagen (2002), Schmitt-Hebbel and Tapia (2002), Sterne (1999), and Svensson
(2001).A second, more fundamental reason to consider the adoption of explicit
inﬂation targeting is simply that in a democracy a central bank should be
fully accountable for the monetary policy that it pursues (see Blinder
1996). Adopting inﬂation-targeting procedures explicitly would improve
the transparency of the policy process and the ability of Congress to hold
the Fed accountable for monetary policy. For both of these reasons it is im-
portant to distill the essence of the implicit inﬂation-targeting procedures
developed under Volcker and Greenspan and to consider how inﬂation tar-
geting could be institutionalized to help the Fed sustain its improved per-
formance after Chairman Greenspan retires.
The paper addresses these objectives in four parts. Section 8.2 describes
the origins of the case for price stability in the United States by reviewing
postwar monetary policy as practiced by the Fed and enumerating the
problems created by failing to make price stability a priority. In particular,
section 8.2 discusses the inﬂationary go/stop era and the Volcker disinﬂa-
tion, and describes the ways in which monetary policy as conducted in the
Greenspan era can be characterized as implicit inﬂation targeting. Section
8.3 considers arguments for and against making low long-run inﬂation a
priority, and whether a quantitative inﬂation target is a good idea. Section
8.4 considers inﬂation targeting in the short run, including complications
involved in managing departures of inﬂation from its long-run target, the
feasibility and desirability of strictly targeting a constant inﬂation objec-
tive in the short run, and the relationship of inﬂation targeting to counter-
cyclical stabilization policy. Finally, section 8.5 suggests how to make the
Fed’s inﬂation-targeting procedures explicit in order to secure the commit-
ment to low inﬂation, enhance transparency, and improve the Fed’s ac-
countability for attaining its monetary policy objectives. A brief summary
concludes the paper.
8.2 Origins of the Case for Price Stability in the United States
In order to appreciate fully the rationale for inﬂation targeting as im-
plicitly practiced in the United States today and why inﬂation targeting will
likely remain at the core of Fed monetary policy in the future, one must un-
derstand the origins of the case for price stability in the United States.
These are found in three distinct subperiods of postwar U.S. monetary his-
tory: the period of inﬂationary go/stop policy from the late 1950s to the late
1970s, the Volcker disinﬂation from 1979 to 1987, and the subsequent
achievement of credibility for low inﬂation under Greenspan. The go/stop
period illustrates the consequences of failing to make low inﬂation a pri-
ority for monetary policy. The Volcker period illustrates the diﬃculty in
restoring credibility for low inﬂation after it has been compromised. And
the Greenspan era illustrates how and why the Fed has come to target low
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below.4
8.2.1 Inﬂationary Go/Stop Monetary Policy
The inﬂationary tendency evident during the period of go/stop mone-
tary policy derived initially from a desire not to repeat the disastrous de-
ﬂation of the 1930s. The disruptive potential of inﬂation was consistently
underestimated, and each increase in inﬂation was tolerated in the belief
that it would soon die down. Moreover, go/stop policy reﬂected the Fed’s
inclination to be responsive to the shifting balance of concerns between in-
ﬂation and unemployment. In the “go” phase of the policy cycle inﬂation
became a major concern only after it clearly moved above its previous
trend; hence, the Fed did not tighten policy early enough to preempt inﬂa-
tionary outbursts before they became a problem. By the time the public be-
came concerned about rising inﬂation, pricing decisions already embodied
higher inﬂation expectations. At that point the Fed would need a recession
to bring inﬂation and inﬂation expectations back down, and an aggressive
increase in short-term interest rates would initiate the “stop” phase of the
policy cycle. At best, there was only a relatively narrow window of public
support for the Fed to raise interest rates. That window opened when ris-
ing inﬂation was widely judged to be a problem and closed after tighter
monetary policy caused the unemployment rate to begin to rise. Thus, the
Fed found it diﬃcult to reverse rising inﬂation, and the trend rate of inﬂa-
tion tended to ratchet up with each go/stop policy cycle (see, e.g., Romer
and Romer 1989).
Another reason for the rising inﬂation trend was that deliberately ex-
pansionary monetary policy in the go phase of the policy cycle came to be
anticipated by workers and ﬁrms. Workers learned to take advantage of
tight labor markets to make higher wage demands, and ﬁrms took advan-
tage of tight product markets to pass along higher costs in higher prices.
Increasingly aggressive wage and price behavior tended to neutralize the
favorable eﬀects of stimulative monetary policy. The Fed persisted in try-
ing to pursue what it regarded as a reasonable balance between inﬂation
and unemployment objectives. But in practice it became ever more expan-
sionary on average in the pursuit of low unemployment, which produced
correspondingly higher inﬂation and inﬂation expectations. As a result,
lenders demanded ever-higher inﬂation premia in bond rates. In the ab-
sence of an anchor for inﬂation, inﬂation expectations and bond rates
moved higher and ﬂuctuated widely, which destabilized the economy and
complicated countercyclical stabilization policy enormously.
In retrospect, the central problem for most of the postwar period up to
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4. Goodfriend (1997) provides a longer-term historical perspective on the evolution of
monetary theory and policy.the Volcker disinﬂation beginning in 1979 was that the Fed tended to jus-
tify its periodic inﬂation-ﬁghting actions against an implicit objective for
low unemployment. In doing so, the Fed made monetary policy a source of
instability and wound up worsening both inﬂation and unemployment.
Eventually the Fed recognized that it would be better to justify its actions
to stimulate employment against a commitment to low inﬂation.
8.2.2 The Volcker Disinﬂation: 1979–87
The case for price stability as we know it today was strengthened by the
extraordinary diﬃculties encountered in dealing with inﬂation during the
period of the Volcker disinﬂation from 1979 to 1987. In particular, the Fed
experienced the adverse consequences of a near total collapse of credibil-
ity for low inﬂation, and learned how diﬃcult it is to pursue interest rate
policy to restore credibility for low inﬂation once that credibility has been
thoroughly compromised. Although the challenges confronting the Fed
during the Volcker disinﬂation were far larger than those today, their na-
ture is similar and still relevant. This section considers, in turn, four fea-
tures of this tumultuous period: the breakdown of mutual understanding
between the Fed and the public, the loss of ﬂexibility to use interest rate
policy to stabilize the output gap, the nature of the cost of restoring low in-
ﬂation, and the inﬂation scare problem.
The Breakdown of Mutual Understanding between the Fed and the Public
By the time that Volcker became Fed chairman in 1979, the sharp in-
crease in the level and volatility of inﬂation and inﬂation expectations born
of the previous decade’s go/stop monetary policy made it exceptionally
diﬃcult for the Fed to contribute constructively to macroeconomic stabi-
lization. The Fed continued to make monetary policy by managing short-
term nominal interest rates. But the eﬀect of interest rate policy on the
economy is determined by its eﬀect on real interest rates—nominal rates
minus inﬂation expectations. Stabilization policy became more diﬃcult, in
part, because relatively large adjustments in the real rate were necessary to
stabilize the economy. Moreover, the Fed found it increasingly diﬃcult to
judge the public’s inﬂation expectations and to gauge how its own policy
actions might inﬂuence those expectations. Hence, the Fed could not judge
how a given nominal interest rate policy action would translate into an ad-
justment in real interest rates. In short, there was a breakdown of mutual
understanding between the Fed and the public: the public could no longer
discern the Fed’s policy intentions, and the Fed could not predict how the
economy would respond to its policy actions. Consequently, the opportu-
nity for policy mistakes was greatly enlarged, and macroeconomic stabi-
lization policy became increasingly diﬃcult.
As a result, the Volcker Fed came to appreciate what the Fed had taken
for granted previously—that monetary policy must be conducted so as to
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ticular, the Volcker Fed realized that price stability must be the cornerstone
of that mutual understanding. In large part the subsequent disinﬂation can
be seen as an eﬀort to rebuild that mutual understanding in order to reha-
bilitate countercyclical stabilization policy.
Loss of Flexibility to Use Interest Rate Policy to 
Stabilize Output Relative to Potential
When the Fed’s credibility for low inﬂation is in question, the Fed loses
the ﬂexibility to use interest rate policy to stabilize output relative to its po-
tential. Obviously, when the Fed needs an output gap to restrain inﬂation
and stabilize inﬂation expectations, it cannot also use interest rate policy to
narrow that output gap. The behavior of interest rate policy in the brief re-
cession of 1980 makes this point well.
The Volcker Fed raised the nominal federal funds rate target sharply
from around 11 percent in September of 1979 to around 17 percent in April
1980 in its initial eﬀort to bring down inﬂation. About half of that 6 per-
centage point increase occurred in the fall of 1979. January 1980 later
turned out to be a National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) busi-
ness cycle peak, and evidence of a weakening economy caused the Fed to
pause in its aggressive tightening between late 1979 and March 1980. But
with the federal funds rate held steady, the thirty-year (long) bond rate
jumped by around 2 percentage points between December and February
despite the weakening in the economy. A number of factors contributed to
the unprecedented increase in inﬂation expectations evident in the sharp
rise in the bond rate: the ongoing increase in oil prices, the unprecedented
rise in the price of gold, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In addi-
tion, the Fed’s hesitation to tighten further probably created doubts about
its willingness to bear the output costs necessary to reduce inﬂation. In any
case, faced with this evidence of a further increase in inﬂation expectations,
the Fed was forced to react with an enormous 3 percentage point increase
in the nominal funds rate in March. The short recession that occurred in
the ﬁrst half of 1980 probably resulted from this aggressive policy tighten-
ing in conjunction with the imposition of credit controls in March (see
Schreft 1990).
Thus, interest rate policy helped to precipitate the 1980 recession as it
would precipitate the 1981–82 recession, and for the same reasons. The dif-
ference is that in 1980 the Fed cut the federal funds rate sharply by around
8 percentage points between April and July to act against the downturn,
and the recession ended quickly with around 8 percent real gross domes-
tic product (GDP) growth in the fourth quarter (4Q) of 1980. However, in-
ﬂation remained high in 1980. The lesson of 1980 was that the Fed could
not restore credibility for low inﬂation if it continued to utilize interest rate
policy to stabilize the output gap.
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The Volcker disinﬂation made particularly clear why it is so costly to re-
store credibility for low inﬂation once it has been compromised. Consider
the striking disinﬂation that occurred in 1981. In early 1981 the Fed main-
tained the nominal federal funds rate at 19 percent. As measured by per-
sonal consumption expenditures (PCE) inﬂation, which was around 10
percent in Q1 1981, real short-term interest rates were then a very high 9
percent. Not surprisingly, the aggressive policy tightening began to take
hold by midyear. The NBER business cycle peak was reached in July, and
real GDP growth fell at a 6 percent annual rate in Q4 1981 and at a 5 per-
cent annual rate in Q1 1982. The Fed brought the nominal federal funds
rate down from 19 percent in the summer to the 14 percent range at the end
of the year, where it remained until the summer of 1982, when it was re-
duced further to around 10 percent.
The 5 percentage point funds rate reduction through the end of 1981 was
large in nominal terms. But PCE inﬂation also fell by about 5 percentage
points by early 1982 to the 5 percent range. To the extent that short-term
inﬂation expectations followed the decline in actual inﬂation during 1981,
the Fed maintained an extraordinarily high 9 percent real funds rate dur-
ing the recession! Amazingly, the Volcker Fed maintained a 9 percent real
short rate even as the recession worsened and the unemployment rate rose
from around 7 percent in July 1981 toward a peak of nearly 10 percent at
the recession trough in November 1982.
Why did interest rate policy remain so extraordinarily tight even after
the sharp break in inﬂation in 1981? One reason is that the behavior of long
bond rates suggested that the Fed’s credibility for low inﬂation continued
to deteriorate. In fact, the long bond rate actually rose by about 3 percent-
age points from January 1981 to more than 14 percent in October, even as
the economy weakened. And although the rate showed some tendency to
decline thereafter, it remained in the 13 to 14 percent range until it began
to come down more persistently in the summer of 1982. Only after this ev-
idence emerged in the bond market, that the Fed was ﬁnally beginning to
acquire credibility for low inﬂation, did the Fed ease policy decisively in
August 1982. This policy easing paved the way for an end to the recession.
Inﬂation stabilized at around 4 percent. And real GDP grew by a spectac-
ular 6.7 percent in 1983 and 4.5 percent in 1984.
The Volcker Fed disinﬂation of 1981 is an extreme illustration of the
point mentioned in section 8.2.2 that, in practice, the Fed needs a recession
to restore credibility for low inﬂation after it has been compromised. The
reason is this: if a disinﬂation is fully credible, then wage and price inﬂation
can slow immediately without much eﬀect on real interest rates or output
(see Ball 1994). If, however, as in 1981, a disinﬂation is not immediately
credible, then wage and price inﬂation continue as before. If the Fed per-
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gate demand moves below potential output, employment falls, and the out-
put gap thus created causes wage and price inﬂation to slow gradually.
Postwar U.S. monetary history makes it abundantly clear that disinﬂation
is costly in practice because credibility for low inﬂation is hard to acquire
after it has been lost. Moreover, the Fed’s commitment to low inﬂation is
only as credible as the public’s support for it. And that support usually re-
mains in question until a disinﬂation is nearly complete.
The Inﬂation Scare Problem
The Fed’s credibility problems during the Volcker era showed up as “in-
ﬂation scares,” sharply rising long-term bond rates reﬂecting rising long-
term inﬂation expectations.5 Inﬂation scares presented the Fed with a
costly dilemma because ignoring them would encourage even more doubt
about the central bank’s commitment to low inﬂation. Yet raising real
short rates to restore credibility for low inﬂation risked precipitating a re-
cession. There were four striking examples of inﬂation scares in the bond
rate during the Volcker era. As discussed above, the Fed’s response to the
ﬁrst two scares in 1980 and 1981 precipitated recessions in those years.
The third inﬂation scare occurred in 1983–84. By then, inﬂation was
running at around 4 percent, and, for the most part, it held in that range
during this episode. Nonetheless, an inﬂation scare in the bond market
raised the long rate from the 10 percent range in the summer of 1983 to its
peak the following summer in the 13 percent range—only about 1 per-
centage point short of its 1981 peak even though inﬂation was over 6 per-
centage points lower in 1983 than in early 1981! The Fed reacted by mov-
ing the nominal funds rate up from the 8 percent range to the 11 percent
range. Inﬂation remained low, so the tightening took the real short-term
interest rate up by about 3 percentage points to around 7 percent brieﬂy in
mid-1984 before the inﬂation scare subsided and the bond rate began to
come down. In this case, the high real short rate needed to contain the scare
succeeded in bringing real GDP growth down to a sustainable 2 to 3 per-
cent range in the second half of 1984. This episode was important because
it demonstrated that a well-timed and well-calibrated series of preemptive
interest rate policy actions could defuse an inﬂation scare without creating
a recession. The 6 percentage point drop in the bond rate from its June
1984 peak to the 7 percent range in early 1986 indicates that the Fed ac-
quired enormous additional credibility for low inﬂation during this period,
in large part no doubt due to the aggressive inﬂation-ﬁghting actions taken
in 1983–84.
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5. See Goodfriend (1993). Ireland (1996a) uses the modern theory of interest to show that
movements in long bond rates reliably signal changes in expected inﬂation. Gurkaynak, Sack,
and Swanson (2003) present evidence that the apparent “excess sensitivity” of long bond rates
to macrodata largely reﬂects ﬂuctuations in inﬂation expectations.Remarkably, even after the Volcker Fed had demonstrated its determi-
nation to act against inﬂation for almost a decade, there was yet another
inﬂation scare when the bond rate rose by 2 percentage points from March
to October 1987. Surprisingly, the Fed reacted little to this scare. In part,
this may have reﬂected real growth weaker than in 1983–84. The scare may
have occurred in part because Volcker was near the end of his term as
chairman and there was doubt about whether the Fed under Volcker’s suc-
cessor would continue to place a high priority on low inﬂation. In any case,
the 1987 scare is particularly striking evidence of the fragility of the credi-
bility of the Fed’s commitment to low inﬂation, possibly connected to the
transition from one Fed chairman to another.
8.2.3 The Greenspan Era: 1987 to the Present
When Alan Greenspan succeeded Paul Volcker as Fed chairman in the
summer of 1987 the inﬂation scare needed immediate attention. However,
the October 1987 stock market crash forced the Fed to ease monetary pol-
icy and put oﬀraising interest rates until the spring of 1988. Judging by the
behavior of the long bond rate, which did not return to its early 1987 levels
until 1992, it took the Greenspan Fed about ﬁve years to overcome the
1987 inﬂation scare.
The discussion of the Greenspan era below is in four parts. It begins by
emphasizing the diﬃculty of reversing even a relatively minor loss of cred-
ibility for low inﬂation. It then describes the preemptive interest rate pol-
icy actions in 1994 that achieved virtual price stability and the beneﬁts,
thereafter, of having achieved full credibility for low inﬂation. One can see
in the behavior of the Greenspan Fed the emergence of an implicit inﬂa-
tion-targeting policy regime. The section concludes by pointing out ﬁve as-
pects of inﬂation targeting practiced implicitly by the Greenspan Fed.
Reversing a Minor Loss of Credibility for Low Inﬂation
As a result of the 1987 inﬂation scare and the policy easing that followed
the October 1987 crash, PCE inﬂation rose by over 2 percentage points
from around 3 percent in 1986 to around 5.5 percent in 1990. In response,
the Fed raised the funds rate by over 3 percentage points to a peak of nearly
10 percent from the spring of 1988 to the spring of 1989 in an eﬀort to re-
verse the rise in inﬂation and inﬂation expectations. As a result of those
policy actions and the Gulf War recession, inﬂation began to recede in
1991. However, the unemployment rate rose by about 1 percentage point
during the 1990–91 recession and rose further to nearly 8 percent in June
1992 during the “jobless recovery” that followed. Here is another instance
where, having been insuﬃciently preemptive in containing inﬂation (in
1987 and 1988), monetary policy was obliged to be more restrictive than
otherwise. With its credibility for low inﬂation compromised earlier, the
Greenspan Fed lowered the federal funds rate tentatively and haltingly
Inﬂation Targeting in the United States? 319from a peak around 8 percent at the start of the recession in mid-1990 to 3
percent in the fall of 1992. By September 1992, the bond rate had returned
to the 7 percent range, inﬂation had come down to around 3 percent, and
the real federal funds rate was therefore near zero.
The zero real short rate was in place for eighteen months from Septem-
ber 1992 to February 1994. During that time the unemployment rate came
down to 6.6 percent, the bond rate fell to the 6 percent range, and the in-
ﬂation rate fell slightly. It appeared that the Fed had acquired an additional
degree of credibility for low inﬂation. To secure that credibility, however,
the Fed would need to preempt rising inﬂation by raising real short rates as
the economy strengthened further in 1994. At a minimum, the Fed would
have to move real short rates up from zero to a range historically consistent
with sustainable growth without inﬂation. In part, preemptive policy was
motivated by yet another inﬂation scare in the bond market. The more than
2 percentage point increase in the bond rate from late 1993 to November
1994 indicated that the Fed’s credibility for low inﬂation still was not se-
cure.
Preemptive Interest Rate Policy in 1994
The series of policy actions that lifted the real funds rate by 3 percentage
points from February 1994 to February 1995 marked the Greenspan Fed’s
ﬁrst preemptive actions against inﬂation. Like the Volcker Fed’s 1983–84
actions, the Greenspan Fed’s 1994 preemptive policy held the line on inﬂa-
tion without creating unemployment. After falling to the mid–5 percent
range during 1994, the unemployment rate moved up only slightly in April
1995 and then began to fall again. The 1994 tightening proved once more
that well-timed preemptive interest rate policy actions are nothing to be
feared. By January 1996 the bond rate was down to around 6 percent, and
there was widespread talk of the “death of inﬂation” (see Bootle 1996).
The successful preemptive policy action in 1994 brought the economy to
virtual price stability. Inﬂation and inﬂation expectations were anchored
more ﬁrmly than ever before. Inﬂation has remained low ever since, and
long bond rates have remained in the 5 to 6 percent range with little evi-
dence of inﬂation scares. Remarkably, price stability was maintained even
though the economy grew in the 4 percent range annually from 1996
through 1999, and the unemployment rate brieﬂy fell below 4 percent for a
while. Unquestionably, rising productivity growth during the period
helped to hold down inﬂation, but the fact that the economy achieved this
growth without much of an increase in inﬂation or an inﬂation scare fur-
ther reinforced the Greenspan Fed’s credibility for low inﬂation.6
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6. Goodfriend (2002b) discusses the consequences of rising productivity growth and cred-
ible price stability in the second half of the 1990s for inﬂation and monetary policy.Beneﬁts of Full Credibility for Low Inﬂation
Three closely related beneﬁts of full credibility for low inﬂation have
been apparent in the second half of the Greenspan era. First, credibility
helped the economy to operate well beyond the levels that might have cre-
ated inﬂation and inﬂation scares in the past. Second, when in 1999 and
2000 the Fed set out to slow the growth of real aggregate demand to a more
sustainable rate, it raised real short rates to the 5 percent range, somewhat
below the range of real short rates it had targeted in previous periods of
policy restraint. As in 1994, less real rate restraint was necessary in 2000
because the Fed did not have to restore low inﬂation or its credibility for
low inﬂation after they had been compromised. Having attained price sta-
bility, the Fed did not need a recession to bring inﬂation and inﬂation ex-
pectations down. The Fed’s objective in 2000 was only to bring aggregate
demand back into line with potential output so that the expansion would
not end with an outbreak of inﬂation, an inﬂation scare, or an unsustain-
able real boom and bust.
Third, when the expansion did end in an unsustainable boom and bust,
the fact that inﬂation and inﬂation expectations were well anchored en-
abled the Greenspan Fed to cut the nominal federal funds rate aggressively
from 6.5 percent to 1.75 percent in 2001 to cushion the fall in aggregate de-
mand and employment.7 Amazingly, the Fed was able to cut the real fed-
eral funds rate by 4 or 5 percentage points to around zero without a hint of
an inﬂation scare. Since the Fed did not needa recession in 2001, it had the
ﬂexibility to cut the real funds rate aggressively to prevent one.
8.2.4 Implicit Inﬂation Targeting Practiced by the Greenspan Fed
When one considers the Greenspan era as a whole, it would appear that
the Greenspan Fed adopted, gradually and implicitly, an approach to
monetary policy that can be characterized as inﬂation targeting. To begin,
the Greenspan Fed must have appreciated something like the case for
price stability described above as it developed in the years of go/stop pol-
icy and during the Volcker disinﬂation. Moreover, Chairman Greenspan
testiﬁed in 1989 in favor of a qualitative zero-inﬂation objective for the
Fed, deﬁned as a situation in which “the expected rate of change of the
general level of prices ceases to be a factor in individual and business de-
cisionmaking” (see Greenspan 1990, 6). Thus, it is reasonable to think
that the Greenspan Fed set out to achieve low enough inﬂation to make
that deﬁnition of price stability a reality. This is the ﬁrst sense in which it
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7. Some economists argue that monetary policy should have acted more aggressively
against the extreme asset price increases in the late 1990s. See Bernanke and Gertler (1999)
and Goodfriend (2003) for reasons why interest rate policy should not react directly to asset
prices.is plausible to think that the Greenspan Fed has adopted an implicit form
of inﬂation targeting.
However, the Greenspan Fed clearly has not focused singlemindedly on
achieving low inﬂation. Had it done so, it surely could have restored low in-
ﬂation and the credibility for low inﬂation lost in 1987–88 sooner than it
did. However, given the initial credibility problems, attempting to act
against inﬂation too aggressively could have come at too great a cost in lost
employment and output. It was plausible to think that the relatively small
slippage in inﬂation and credibility for low inﬂation that occurred in the
late 1980s could be contained eventually without an aggressive monetary
tightening. Such reasoning probably contributed to the decision to pursue
a mildly restrictive interest rate policy to build back credibility for low in-
ﬂation gradually. In other words, the Greenspan Fed displayed great pa-
tience in overcoming the eﬀects on inﬂation and Fed credibility of the un-
fortunate initial conditions (the 1987 inﬂation scare and stock market
crash) that it started with.
Moreover, the Greenspan Fed did not proceed to push the inﬂation rate
down deliberately to price stability after 1992 in a way that might have been
costly in terms of employment and output. Instead, preemptive policy was
utilized in 1994 to reinforce the transition to price stability. The Fed held
real short rates near zero for a year and a half until the economy showed
strength in 1994 and then acted to preempt what might have been a cycli-
cal increase in inﬂation. Holding the line on inﬂation proved to be a virtu-
ally costless way of moving the economy to price stability and fully secur-
ing the Fed’s credibility for low inﬂation.
The manner in which the Greenspan Fed moved to restore credibility for
low inﬂation before 1992 and pushed to price stability after 1992 demon-
strates a second sense in which it may be said to have targeted inﬂation im-
plicitly. It is clear that the Greenspan Fed practiced a form of ﬂexible in-
ﬂation targeting in its pursuit of price stability.
Arguably, it is plausible to think that the Fed has ﬁnally achieved price
stability in the sense that a measure of inﬂation favored by the Fed, core
PCE inﬂation, has remained in the 1 to 2 percent range since the mid-1990s
(see Federal Open Market Committee 1996, 11). It is diﬃcult to imagine
circumstances that would cause the Greenspan Fed to deliberately target
core PCE inﬂation above 2 percent in either the long run or the short run.
This is the third sense in which it may be said that the Greenspan Fed has
adopted an implicit form of inﬂation targeting. Likewise, it is hard to imag-
ine any circumstances in which the Greenspan Fed would deliberately tar-
get core PCE inﬂation below 1 percent. There is no reason to take the in-
ﬂation rate lower than that, given the risk of deﬂation and the problems
associated with the zero bound on nominal interest rates. This is the fourth
sense in which it may be said that the Greenspan Fed has adopted an im-
plicit form of inﬂation targeting.
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large part to enhance the ﬂexibility of interest rate policy to stabilize the
output gap over the business cycle. For instance, the discussion above ex-
plained how the Greenspan Fed exploited its full credibility for low inﬂa-
tion to lower short-term interest rates ﬂexibly to cushion the 2001 reces-
sion. In this sense, inﬂation targeting as practiced by the Greenspan Fed
involves a ﬁfthcharacteristic: constrained countercyclical stabilization pol-
icy. In other words, the Greenspan Fed appears willing to pursue aggres-
sive countercyclical interest rate policy as long as inﬂation and inﬂation ex-
pectations remain anchored in or near the long-run target range.
8.3 Should Low Long-Run Inﬂation Be a Priority?
Since the record shows that the Greenspan Fed has pursued inﬂation
targeting implicitly, we now ask what features of those implicit inﬂation-
targeting procedures should be made explicit. We use the case for inﬂation
targeting developed in section 8.2 to help answer that question. In this sec-
tion we consider only whether the Fed should make low long-run inﬂation
a priority. We begin with arguments supporting a priority for price stabil-
ity. Then we consider opposing arguments and counterarguments. Finally
we consider the case for a quantitative long-run inﬂation target.
8.3.1 Arguments Supporting a Long-Run Priority for Price Stability
A priority for low long-run inﬂation derives not so much from a belief in
its intrinsic value relative to other goals such as full employment and eco-
nomic growth, but from theory and evidence suggesting that monetary
policy encourages employment and growth in the long run mostly by con-
trolling inﬂation (see, e.g., Feldstein 1997 and Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City 1996). Moreover, the U.S. monetary policy record outlined in
section 8.2 suggests that the ﬂexibility to pursue short-run stabilization
policy has been enhanced by a credible commitment to low inﬂation. Ar-
guably, that credibility would be strengthened if the Fed announced pub-
licly a priority for low long-run inﬂation.8
Further, in 1994 the Fed began to announce its current federal funds rate
target publicly for the ﬁrst time. The Fed became more forthcoming about
its policy instrument in part because Congress and the public expressed an
interest in greater transparency in monetary policy. For instance, all twelve
reserve bank presidents were invited to explain their views on monetary pol-
icy before the Senate banking committee in March 1993 and again before
the House banking committee in October of that year. This increased trans-
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8. Fed oﬃcials have spoken repeatedly over the years about the beneﬁts of low inﬂation and
the Fed’s commitment to price stability. However, the Fed has not asserted a priority for low
long-run inﬂation.parency of the Fed’s policy instrument, the federal funds rate, has enhanced
the understanding of monetary policy and facilitated a public debate about
Fed policy. A healthy debate about whether the Fed’s policy actions are ap-
propriate to achieve its objectives is to be expected. But the current situation
is one in which the Fed has not clariﬁed its priority for low inﬂation as well
as it might. Thus, a debate about Fed policy actions in the current institu-
tional environment can become a debate about the Fed’s policy objectives.
The combination of instrument transparency with ambiguity about the
priority for low inﬂation creates problems for monetary policy. For in-
stance, the visibility of the Fed’s aggressive preemptive tightening against
inﬂation in 1994 attracted much criticism in part because the priority the
Fed placed on low inﬂation had not been clariﬁed, understood, and ac-
cepted by Congress and the public. The criticism from Congress and else-
where at the time was seen by many as a threat to price stability and prob-
ably contributed to the severity of the inﬂation scare that raised the long
bond rate by over 2 percentage points in 1994. Especially now that price
stability has been achieved and the transition costs are behind us, the Fed’s
commitment to long-run price stability could be clariﬁed to minimize the
risk that a debate about Fed policy actions could create inﬂation scares in
the future.9
8.3.2 Opposing Arguments and Counterarguments
The most fundamental argument against making low long-run inﬂation
a priority is that it might unduly constrain interest rate policy from stabi-
lizing output relative to its potential in the short run. The concern is that,
in practice, the Fed might become more timid in using interest rate policy
ﬂexibly to stabilize real economic activity over the business cycle for fear of
the inﬂationary consequences. That being said, the policy record outlined
above shows that the Fed’s power to stabilize the output gap over the busi-
ness cycle was considerably enhanced as inﬂation and inﬂation expecta-
tions became more ﬁrmly anchored. Nevertheless, the above argument
must be taken seriously.
The second argument against formally adopting a priority for low long-
run inﬂation is that there is little to be gained, since the Fed has achieved
and maintained low inﬂation by “just doing it.” The Greenspan Fed ap-
pears to have acquired near-full credibility for low inﬂation without a for-
mal priority for low inﬂation. And there is every reason to think that the
Greenspan Fed can continue to pursue inﬂation targeting implicitly and
successfully. This argument seems to take it for granted that the Fed needs
no institutional help in carrying on after Chairman Greenspan retires.
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9. Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2003) present evidence indicating that the Bank of En-
gland’s credible commitment to an inﬂation target helped to anchor long-term inﬂation ex-
pectations and bond rates in the United Kingdom.The third argument admits that a legislative mandate for low long-run
inﬂation would be helpful but stresses that it would be awkward, inappro-
priate, and potentially counterproductive for the Fed to announce a pri-
ority for low long-run inﬂation unilaterally. To be sure, the Fed is an inde-
pendent central bank in the sense that its interest rate policy actions are
not subject to further evaluation by other authorities. And Congress did
not object to the Volcker disinﬂation and the Greenspan Fed transition to
price stability. Yet the Fed is supposed to take direction on its goals from
Congress. The current understanding between the Fed and Congress
would appear to amount to a “don’t ask, don’t tell” equilibrium: Congress
doesn’t ask the Fed whether it places a priority on low long-run inﬂation,
and the Fed does not say whether it has such a priority.10 Both the Fed and
Congress appear to be satisﬁed with “don’t ask, don’t tell,” so apparently
the status quo is satisfactory.
The problem with this argument is that waiting for Congress to endorse
formally a priority for low long-run inﬂation poses some risks. Currently,
a large fraction of the public has had ﬁrsthand experience with inﬂation
and naturally supports the view that it must be contained. But as the Fed
succeeds over time in maintaining low inﬂation, that collective memory
will fade, and Congress will be less likely to mandate a priority for price sta-
bility than it may be today. If the Greenspan Fed, in its capacity as the
repository of central-banking expertise in the United States, believes that
monetary policy would beneﬁt from a legislatively mandated priority for
low long-run inﬂation, then it could askCongress for one. The time is right
to do so. Because price stability has been achieved, transition costs are no
longer an obstacle. More important, the public has great conﬁdence in the
Greenspan Fed, and future Feds will have less personal experience with
and appreciation of the reasons why monetary policy would beneﬁt from
such a mandate. Institutionalizing that knowledge and experience in a
mandate will go a long way toward insuring that future generations do not
repeat the inﬂationary mistakes of the past.
8.3.3 The Case for a Quantitative Long-Run Inﬂation Target
The above discussion made the case that low long-run inﬂation should
be a priority for monetary policy. In principle, that priority could be spec-
iﬁed in either a qualitative or a quantitative way. If a priority for low inﬂa-
tion is largely about anchoring inﬂation expectations, then arguably much
of the beneﬁt could be derived by specifying the priority in qualitative lan-
guage using Chairman Greenspan’s deﬁnition of price stability. For in-
stance, such a commitment could be stated as a priority for maintaining
Inﬂation Targeting in the United States? 325
10. Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC; 1996, 64, 67, 72) indicates the consensus
within the FOMC on the desirability of a 2 percent long-run objective for a CPI measure of
inﬂation.monetary conditions in which “the expected rate of change of the general
level of prices ceases to be a factor in individual and business decision
making.” The discussion above suggests that explicitly adopting even a
qualitative priority for low long-run inﬂation would be a major step for-
ward for monetary policy.
There are a number of reasons, however, why a priority for low long-run
inﬂation could be stated usefully in quantitative terms. The Fed could
choose the measure of inﬂation to target from any number of candidate
measures that have been exceptionally stable since the mid-1990s. More-
over, Fed staﬀ routinely use for internal policy simulations a quantitative
working deﬁnition of low inﬂation that constitutes price stability. Ar-
guably, that working deﬁnition is the FOMC’s de facto quantitative long-
run inﬂation target, and it would serve naturally as a quantitative long-run
inﬂation target for external purposes as well. It makes sense to put a quan-
titative lower bound on inﬂation to protect against deﬂation and the prob-
lem of the zero bound on nominal interest rates. Announcing an explicit
lower bound on inﬂation would make the public more conﬁdent that the
Fed will not allow the United States to fall into a Japanese-style deﬂation,
zero-bound trap. That, in turn, would protect against potentially destabi-
lizing deﬂation scares, to which the Fed would have to respond by pushing
the nominal funds rate closer to zero. If it makes sense for the Fed to an-
nounce an explicit lower bound on its long-run inﬂation target to protect
against deﬂation, then it also makes sense to announce an explicit upper
bound to emphasize that the Fed intends to hold the line on inﬂation as
well. Finally, a quantitative long-run inﬂation target would serve as a bet-
ter benchmark against which to judge departures from price stability in the
short run.
A target range would have advantages over a point inﬂation target. A
target range would give the Fed a “safe harbor” within which it would not
have to explain or respond to movements in inﬂation very much. Only
when inﬂation moved outside the range would the Fed be expected to ex-
plain how policy would return inﬂation to the range. Without a range, the
Fed might ﬁnd it diﬃcult to switch rhetorically from relatively little con-
cern about inﬂation to greater concern when inﬂation moved up or down
on a sustained basis. Specifying a quantitative range would not tie the Fed’s
hands in practice. What it would do is put the burden of proof on the Fed
to explain how it intends to return inﬂation to its target. And that would be
a valuable disciplining device.
A range of 1 to 2 percent for core PCE inﬂation monthly over twelve or
twenty-four months earlier would be a reasonable quantitative long-run
target. The Fed is apparently comfortable using the core PCE price index
to measure inﬂation (see Federal Open Market Committee 1996, 11). Core
PCE inﬂation has ranged between 1 and 2 percent since 1997. Given this
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way for routine short-run ﬂuctuations of inﬂation. Finally, core PCE inﬂa-
tion would provide a more stable measure than overall PCE inﬂation
against which to judge departures from price stability in the short run.
The main reasons for the Fed not to adopt a quantitative inﬂation target
are fourfold. First, the Fed may not be quite sure yet what measure of in-
ﬂation and target range to adopt. Second, as discussed above, there is no
pressing need to adopt a quantitative inﬂation target. Finally, the Fed’s
credibility for low inﬂation may actually be jeopardized if, for whatever
reason, it cannot keep inﬂation within its long-run quantitative target
range. Fourth, adopting a quantitative inﬂation target may generate pres-
sure to adopt a quantitative target for the unemployment rate, which would
create problems for monetary policy of the sort encountered during the go/
stop period reviewed in section 8.2.1.
8.4 Inﬂation Targeting in the Short Run
This section considers inﬂation targeting in the short run. It begins by
outlining complications that the Fed must confront in managing depar-
tures of inﬂation from the long-run target range. It then suggests strongly
that it is both feasible and desirable for the Fed to keep inﬂation within its
long-run inﬂation target even in the short run. The section closes by point-
ing out that strict inﬂation targeting is compatible with stabilizing output
at its potential over the business cycle in a reasonable benchmark macro-
model.
This discussion does not deny that inﬂation could be pushed outside of
the target range in the short run. The analysis asserts only that it is likely to
take an exceptional event to destabilize inﬂation when the Fed purpose-
fully pursues price stability. Undoubtedly, bad luck or bad judgment could
create excessively inﬂationary or deﬂationary conditions. If that were to
happen, then presumably the Fed would return inﬂation to the target range
ﬂexibility, much as the Greenspan Fed restored credibility for low inﬂation
in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
8.4.1 Managing Departures of Inﬂation from the Long-Run Target
If inﬂation moves outside its long-run target range, for whatever reason,
the Fed must choose a path for its interest rate policy instrument that bal-
ances the speed with which inﬂation is returned to target against the cost
in lost output relative to potential. The Fed must decide how fastto rebuild
credibility for its long-run inﬂation objective. As a formal matter, the deci-
sion would depend on the following factors: (a) the mechanism by which
interest rate policy is assumed to be transmitted to aggregate demand in the
macromodel used by the Fed; (b) the speciﬁcation of the relationships
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process in that macromodel; (c) the relative weights placed on the output
gap and inﬂation stabilization in the Fed’s (implicit) loss function, or (d)
the length of time that the Fed arbitrarily allows for returning its condi-
tional inﬂation forecast to the long-run target; and (e) any conditional in-
formation on current shocks and adjustments to the model or the loss
function weights due to special circumstances or evolving economic con-
ditions. In sum, the policy response would depend on all information avail-
able to the Fed aﬀecting the conditional inﬂation forecast and the output-
gap forecast (see Svensson 1999 and Galí 2001).
The complexity of the elements listed above shows how diﬃcult it is for
the Fed to manage inﬂation once it moves outside its long-run target range.
Arguably, the inﬂation-generating process is the weakest part of the
macromodel. Among other things the cost, in terms of lost output relative
to potential, of returning inﬂation to its long-run range depends on the
credibility of the Fed’s commitment to do so. The historical record dis-
cussed in section 8.2 suggests that such credibility is sensitive to the Fed’s
actions themselves in the context of other aspects of the political economy
in a way that is diﬃcult to model. In any particular case the Fed must judge
the extent to which drawing out the return of inﬂation to its long-run tar-
get might be counterproductive by reducing the credibility of its intention
to bring inﬂation all the way back down. That consideration must be bal-
anced against attempting to bring inﬂation down before the credibility for
doing so has been built up. An error in either direction would increase the
output cost of restoring price stability.
Another problem arises because the Fed may tend to overstate the extent
to which inﬂation has an inherent tendency to persist after it has been
shocked. U.S. inﬂation has exhibited a high degree of persistence in the
past (see Fuhrer and Moore 1995 and Goodfriend and King 2001, 75–81).
The Fed tolerated outbursts of inﬂation in the go phase of the policy cycle
and showed only a limited inclination to risk recession to reverse those out-
bursts but a willingness to allow “opportunistic” shocks to reduce inﬂa-
tion. Thus, both positive and negative inﬂation shocks tended to be prop-
agated through time.11 Firms would quickly build a shock to inﬂation into
inﬂation expectations and incorporate those expectations into their own
price-setting behavior. By underestimating its own role in creating inﬂation
persistence in the past, the Fed may be too quick to accommodate and
propagate deviations of inﬂation from its long-run target in the present (see
Cecchetti 1995 and Cogley and Sargent 2001).
It is optimal for the monetary authority to vary its short-run inﬂation
target deliberately in response to some shocks in some macromodels. How-
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11. The empirical ﬁndings reported in Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) reﬂect this behavior.ever, that optimal variation depends sensitively on the details of the macro-
model and on the size and type of shocks hitting the economy. Given our
uncertainty about the structure of the economy, the diﬃculty in promptly
and accurately identifying the shocks hitting the economy, and the com-
plications discussed above, attempting to ﬁne-tune the inﬂation target in
the short run is more likely to be counterproductive than not (see Or-
phanides and Williams 2002 and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2002). In any
case, the historical record suggests that the Fed’s ability to deliberately and
systematically manipulate inﬂation in response to shocks is very limited.
Moreover, such attempted manipulation would open the door to inﬂation
scares. For all these reasons the presumption must be that it is inadvisable
for the Fed to attempt to vary the short-run inﬂation target deliberately
over time.
8.4.2 Precluding Inﬂation from Moving Outside the Long-Run Range
As a practical matter, the Fed can adhere closely to its long-run inﬂation
target only if interest rate policy can precludeshocks from moving inﬂation
outside the long-run target range. Is it plausible that the Fed can do so? The
answer would appear to be yes, especially for a core inﬂation index that ex-
cludes highly ﬂexible commodity and food prices. As mentioned above, ev-
idence from the mid-1990s to the present suggests that inﬂation will remain
stable over the business cycle when the Fed makes price stability a priority.
Theory suggests why the Fed has been able to stabilize inﬂation so well
and is likely to continue to do so in the future. Credibility for stable prices
is self-enforcing to a great extent. Forward-looking, sticky-price ﬁrms are
less likely to pass cost shocks through to prices if ﬁrms expect the Fed to
take policy actions promptly to conform aggregate demand to potential
output in order to relieve the cost pressures (see Taylor 2000). Moreover,
credible price stability gives the Fed greater leeway to cut short-term inter-
est rates in response to a ﬁnancial market crisis or to stabilize the output
gap without creating inﬂation or an inﬂation scare in bond markets. Thus,
the Fed was able to cut the federal funds rate target by 75 basis points in
1998–99 in aftermath of the Russian debt default, and then by 475 basis
points when the economy turned down in 2001, without much eﬀect on in-
ﬂation or inﬂation expectations in either case. Because the Fed is known to
have such leeway to act aggressively and preemptively against recessions,
ﬁrms are less likely to pass deﬂationary cost shocks through to prices as
well.
8.4.3 Strict Inﬂation Targeting and Countercyclical Stabilization Policy
According to the argument above, strictly targeting core inﬂation within
its long-run range has much to recommend it. The strength of that argu-
ment derived in part from the fact that doing otherwise would require the
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which there is much uncertainty. This section supplements the case by
pointing out that strict inﬂation targeting is entirely consistent with stabi-
lizing output at its potential over the business cycle in a reasonable bench-
mark macromodel. In other words, strict inﬂation targeting can be re-
garded as the anchor for constrained countercyclical stabilization policy
along the lines of the description in section 8.2.4 of inﬂation targeting as
practiced by the Greenspan Fed. From this perspective, even those who
care mainly about output and employment can support strict inﬂation tar-
geting.
This point is clear with respect to a shock to aggregate demand. For in-
stance, a positive shock that moves aggregate demand above potential out-
put would increase labor demand and put upward pressure on wages. That
cost pressure would be passed to sticky (core) prices in the absence of a
tightening of monetary policy. However, by raising short-term interest
rates, the Fed could bring aggregate demand back into line with potential
output, move employment back down, eliminate the upward pressure on
wages, and hold the line on inﬂation. In other words, interest rate policy
can stabilize simultaneously both inﬂation and the output gap in the face
of a shock to aggregate demand.
What about a shock to aggregate supply, such as a temporary increase in
the price of oil? The question is: can the interest rate policy actions that sta-
bilize core inﬂation against an oil price shock also be construed as stabiliz-
ing output relative to its potential? The higher price of oil would raise the
cost of production for sticky-price ﬁrms, and again that cost pressure could
be passed to sticky (core) prices in the absence of a tightening of monetary
policy. To stabilize sticky (core) price inﬂation the Fed would have to raise
real short rates and depress aggregate demand enough to reduce employ-
ment and wages in order to oﬀset the eﬀect of higher oil prices on produc-
tion costs. In eﬀect, price stability could be maintained by making aggre-
gate demand conform to the temporary reduction in potential output.
From this perspective, the answer to the question above could be yes.
In fact, in a benchmark macromodel with sticky prices and eﬀectively
ﬂexible wages, interest rate policy that stabilizes sticky (core) prices au-
tomatically makes output conform to its time-varying potential.12 The
reason is twofold: (a) strict inﬂation targeting neutralizes ﬂuctuations in
employment and output that would otherwise occur due to sticky prices,
and (b) eﬀective wage ﬂexibility assures that output ﬂuctuates with its po-
tential deﬁned as the outcome of an imperfectly competitive real business
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12. See Goodfriend and King (1997, 2001) and Goodfriend (2002a) for a discussion of the
benchmark new neoclassical synthesis model in which strict inﬂation targeting also stabilizes
the output gap. Goodfriend (2002a), Ireland (1996b), and Woodford (2001) show why strict
inﬂation targeting maximizes welfare in related models.cycle  model with a constant markup and perfectly ﬂexible wages and
prices.
Of course, there is some question about the extent to which actual wages
are eﬀectively ﬂexible. Nominal wages exhibit about the same temporary
rigidity as nominal prices (see Taylor 1999). To the extent that nominal
wages are temporarily rigid, the Fed might have to push employment and
output below potential as deﬁned above in order to relieve cost pressures
and stabilize core inﬂation against an oil price shock. Pushing employment
down further would reduce labor costs by raising the marginal physical
product of labor. In this case, however, the Fed would face a short-run
trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output relative to its potential.
That being said, there are two reasons why such a trade-oﬀmay be of rel-
atively little concern in practice. First, an inﬂation target of 1 to 2 percent
with trend productivity growth of around 2 percent would yield average
nominal wage growth in the 3 to 4 percent range. Such high nominal wage
growth should keep the economy safely away from situations in which sig-
niﬁcant downward nominal wage rigidity, as opposed to slower nominal
wage growth, is required to stabilize inﬂation and the output gap. Second,
wages may be eﬀectively ﬂexible in the context of the long-term implicit
and explicit contracts that characterize most employment relationships. It
would be ineﬃcient for either ﬁrms or workers to allow temporary nomi-
nal wage rigidity to upset the terms of otherwise eﬃcient long-term em-
ployment relationships. In particular, one might expect future wage ad-
justments to undo any eﬀects of temporary nominal wage stickiness, so
that wages would be eﬀectively ﬂexible. Such behavior would neutralize the
allocative consequences of sticky nominal wages (see Barro 1977 and Hall
1999).
8.5 How to Make Inﬂation Targeting Explicit in the United States
At the core of the case for inﬂation targeting is the idea that monetary
policy encourages economic growth and stabilizes output at its potential
over the business cycle in large part by anchoring inﬂation and inﬂation ex-
pectations. The need to inﬂuence expectations puts a premium on a cen-
tral bank’s credibility, commitment to goals, and perceived independence
and competence to achieve its objectives. Currently, these foundations are
secure in the United States because the public has conﬁdence in the
Greenspan Fed. If price stability is to be sustained, however, the operating
procedures of the Greenspan Fed must be credibly transferred to its suc-
cessor. Over the long run, the Fed’s credibility must be based on an under-
standing of how inﬂation targeting works rather than being based in the
leadership of the Fed. Making the Fed’s inﬂation-targeting procedures ex-
plicit would help to achieve these ends by securing the Fed’s commitment
to low inﬂation and improving the transparency and accountability of the
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Ferguson 2002).
Based on the discussion above, it seems fair to say that, consistent with
theory and U.S. experience, and in line with practices that have been
adopted abroad, low inﬂation is a priority for Fed monetary policy in the
following sense: in the long run there are no circumstances in which sus-
tained inﬂation should ever be much higher or lower than it is today. A
public acknowledgment by the Fed of this would be a useful starting point
for making the Fed’s inﬂation-targeting procedures explicit. The priority
for long-run price stability would simply reﬂect best-practice monetary
policy as the Fed, other central banks, and the economics profession have
come to understand it. Hence, the Fed could assert that priority on its own
initiative without direction from Congress. In fact, the Fed has an obliga-
tion to inform Congress to that eﬀect without any expectation of a re-
sponse in order to help the oversight committees understand better how to
evaluate monetary policy. The Fed Chairman could add that as a practical
matter there is little reason for the Fed deliberately to allow inﬂation to de-
viate from price stability in the short run either, since price stability best fa-
cilitates maximum sustainable employment, growth, and output stabiliza-
tion relative to potential.
A unilateral acknowledgement of this sort would be worthwhile in its
own right. Openly clarifying the priority for price stability would reinforce
the Fed’s commitment to low inﬂation and enhance the credibility of that
commitment. It would balance the recently increased transparency of the
Fed’s interest rate instrument with greater transparency of its low-inﬂation
goal. And it would act to defuse further the idea that secrecy has any role
to play in monetary policy (see Goodfriend 1986). In this regard, the Fed
could go further and publicly acknowledge its quantitative working deﬁni-
tion of long-run price stability. If a 1 to 2 percent range for core PCE inﬂa-
tion is it, then the Fed could acknowledge that it intends to keep core PCE
inﬂation in or near that range indeﬁnitely.
An acknowledgement of either a quantitative or a qualitative priority for
low long-run inﬂation would open the door for the oversight committees
in Congress to recognizea priority for low long-run inﬂation. By accepting
that priority, the oversight committees could then hold the Fed account-
able for maintaining low inﬂation. Presumably, the Fed would welcome be-
ing held accountable by Congress because that would secure further its
commitment to low inﬂation. Congress, of course, might be concerned that
holding the Fed accountable for low long-runinﬂation would skew Fed pol-
icy in the short run toward price stability at the expense of stabilizing out-
put relative to its potential. The reality, though, is that it is not feasible to
hold the Fed accountable for employment or output objectives because in
the long run these are determined independentlyof monetary policy. This is
the lesson of the inﬂationary go/stop period discussed in section 8.2.1.
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the Fed’s reasoning about short-run policy can be assessed more fully, Con-
gress may be reluctant to recognize a priority for low long-run inﬂation.
And without some assurance that Congress accepts a priority for low long-
run inﬂation, the Fed may be reluctant to be more transparent about how it
strikes a balance between inﬂation and output in the short run.
This conundrum suggests the following possibility: in exchange for a
congressional acceptance of a priority for low long-run inﬂation, the Fed
could consider participating in a public monetary policy forum where the
FOMC (through its chairman and other representatives) would subject its
current assessment of the economy and thinking about recent policy ac-
tions to questions from invited academic and business economists who are
expert in monetary policy. The discussion would be disciplined by a con-
gressional directive to utilize monetary policy ﬂexibly to stabilize output at
its potential over the business cyclesubject to inﬂation remaining in or near
its long-run target range.
The policy forum could be held publicly for one full day, twice a year, a
month before the Fed’s regular monetary policy reports to Congress in or-
der to unearth key policy issues and better inform the congressional over-
sight hearings. Invited participants would be drawn from the community
of professional Fed watchers, economic forecasters, and academic mone-
tary economists. The forum could be arranged and participants invited by
the Fed itself or by a private nonproﬁt sponsor. It would be held indepen-
dently of Congress, although representatives from Congress would be wel-
come to attend. By enabling Congress to observe a professional exchange
of views on monetary policy, the forum would give Congress more insight
into the thinking of the FOMC.
To achieve balance in the questions and comments, the invited partici-
pants should be grouped according to whether they think that policy is too
easy, about right, or too tight, and equal time should be given to all points
of view. The opportunity for the FOMC to address comments and ques-
tions from all perspectives would enable the Fed to build public under-
standing as well as conﬁdence in its own policy position. The Fed’s think-
ing on the economy and current policy could be summarized in an
“Inﬂation Report” prepared and distributed in advance of the forum. The
forum would provide the Fed with regular opportunities to respond to pro-
fessional comments on its assessments of the economy without appearing
defensive or self-congratulatory. The forum would also provide the Fed
with a convenient and eﬃcient means of acquiring regular professional ad-
vice and council on monetary policy. Finally, the forum would help to ed-
ucate economists, the press, and the ﬁnancial markets so that eventually
the public’s conﬁdence in monetary policy could be based on a deeper un-
derstanding of how inﬂation targeting works to optimize the economy’s
performance.
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The paper began by tracing the origins of the case for inﬂation targeting
in postwar U.S. monetary history from the inﬂationary go/stop period,
through the Volcker disinﬂation, to the period of price stability in the
Greenspan era. This historical review made clear why the Fed has made
price stability a priority as never before in its history and why low inﬂation
will remain a priority indeﬁnitely. In particular, the historical review served
three purposes. First, it showed why price stability improves monetary pol-
icy. Second, it showed how the Greenspan Fed practices inﬂation target-
ing implicitly. Third, it showed why the Fed should continue to utilize the
inﬂation-targeting procedures developed and employed implicitly by the
Greenspan Fed after Chairman Greenspan retires.
In the second half of the paper consideration was given to whether the
Fed’s implicit inﬂation-targeting procedures should be made explicit, how
tightly inﬂation should be targeted in the short run, and how the Fed’s in-
ﬂation targeting procedures could be made explicit. The main ﬁndings were
these: (a) low long-run inﬂation should be an explicit priority for monetary
policy; (b) as a practical matter it is not desirable for the Fed to vary its in-
ﬂation target in the short run; and (c) strict inﬂation targeting can be eﬃ-
cient constrained countercyclical stabilization policy. The Fed should pub-
licly acknowledge its implicit priority for low long-run inﬂation so that
Congress could publicly accept that priority and agree to hold the Fed ac-
countable for attaining it. In return, representatives of the FOMC should
consider participating in a monetary policy forum to better inform the con-
gressional oversight committees and the public about current monetary
policy.
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Comment Donald L. Kohn
Introduction
Marvin Goodfriend answers the question in his title with a “yes” and, in
the process, has provided us with an excellent foundation for a discussion
of inﬂation targeting in the United States. I completely agree with the fun-
damental premise that low inﬂation is an indispensable long-run focus of
the central bank. Low and stable rates of inﬂation allow economies to func-
tion more eﬀectively, and having inﬂation expectations anchored facili-
tates countercyclical monetary policy and improves the trade-oﬀ between
output and inﬂation that policymakers face. For the most part, in a regime
of ﬂexible exchange rates, the trend of prices over the long run should be
under the control of the central bank, and exercising that control to
achieve something approximating price stability over time is the way the
central bank can best contribute to the long-run prosperity of its economy.
Marvin builds his case in the ﬁrst part of his paper by recounting the ex-
perience of the United States over the last thirty years or so. I have no quar-
rel with the overall arc of his story.1The rise of inﬂation from the mid-1960s
through the 1970s was highly damaging to the performance of the U.S.
Inﬂation Targeting in the United States? 337
Donald L. Kohn is a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
The views in this comment are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of
other members of the Federal Open Market Committee, the Board, or its staﬀ. Brian Sack of
the Board’s staﬀ contributed importantly to this comment.
1. However, I do take issue with his descriptions of several episodes over the period. In par-
ticular, see my critique of his discussion of the 1986–90 period.economy and could have been stopped and reversed much earlier than it
was by a determined monetary policy better focused on price stability. The
restoration of price stability has taken time and entailed considerable cost
to output in the 1979–82 period and, perhaps, some constraint on policy
ﬂexibility thereafter. A number of factors have contributed to the reestab-
lishment of price stability, but surely an essential ingredient has been the at-
tention that the Federal Reserve has paid to long-run trends in inﬂation and
inﬂation expectations since 1979. We are better oﬀ now that price stability
has been restored and economic agents expect inﬂation to stay low and
stable. Moreover, this stability has been accomplished in the context of a
highly successful policy strategy that, by anticipating emerging imbalances
and actively leaning against shocks to the ﬁnancial sector and the real econ-
omy, has contributed to two extraordinarily long expansions since 1980.
Marvin argues that to extend this successful policy record the United
States should adopt an explicit, numerical target range for inﬂation and the
Federal Reserve should strive to keep inﬂation in or near that range.2How-
ever, in my opinion, adopting such an inﬂation target would not be an eﬀec-
tive means for locking in past policy practices. I do not believe that inﬂa-
tion targeting, in any meaningful sense of that term, describes what the
Federal Reserve has been doing over the last twenty years, or even in recent
years, when Marvin claims that policy has evolved into “implicit” inﬂation
targeting. Instead, the success of U.S. monetary policy has in large part de-
rived from its ability to adapt to changing conditions—a ﬂexibility that
likely has beneﬁted from the absence of an inﬂation target. Nonetheless,
the U.S. economy has enjoyed most of the beneﬁts ascribed to inﬂation tar-
geting in terms of anchoring inﬂation expectations as well as inﬂation it-
self. It is the focus on long-term price stability that has fostered these ben-
eﬁts, and I believe that this focus will not be at risk with a change in
personnel at the Federal Reserve. Considering these points, I am skeptical
that for the United States the potential beneﬁts of changing to a regime of
inﬂation targeting would outweigh its possible costs. Let me develop my ar-
gument.
The Federal Reserve Has Not Been Practicing Inﬂation Targeting.
One diﬃculty in assessing whether the United States has been practicing
inﬂation targeting is in deﬁning the term. For more than twenty years, the
Federal Reserve has conducted policy with one eye on fostering long-run
price stability over time. The law speciﬁes price stability as one of the Fed-
eral Reserve’s long-term objectives; its importance to economic perfor-
mance has been supported by theory and experience, and hence achieving
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2. He does not recommend “inﬂation-forecast targeting,” in which the central bank, to
achieve an inﬂation target, aims at the intermediate objective of an explicit, published, inﬂa-
tion forecast. Consequently, I have not commented on this aspect of many inﬂation-targeting
frameworks.this objective has been a key inﬂuence, together with promoting maximum
sustainable output, on monetary policy actions. The Federal Reserve has
stated publicly many times that it considers long-run price stability both its
unique responsibility and the way it can contribute to maximum growth
and employment over time.3
Although some might view this policy approach as inﬂation targeting,
this would be a very weak deﬁnition. I believe that inﬂation targeting, as
commonly understood and recommended, involves more substance and
constraint than this allegiance to achieving price stability over the long run.
As Marvin’s discussion suggests, there are two key elements in inﬂation
targeting. First is the announcement of an explicit, numerical, inﬂation
target. The numerical goal is important because putting a number on the
objective gives it weight and importance and a focus for accountability—
it becomes an explicit yardstick against which to measure performance.
The second element is a priority for price stability in monetary policy.
Such a priority usually implies a presumption that the central bank should
act to keep inﬂation at the target (or in the range) within some time hori-
zon—that is, that the central bank would not deliberately allow inﬂation
to deviate from the target and would return it to the target promptly if
shocks pushed it away.
I recognize that ﬂexible inﬂation-targeting frameworks can be derived
from structures that minimize the variability of output around potential as
well as inﬂation around its target. But inﬂation targeting is not usually
framed that way in practice. In inﬂation-targeting countries, either the cen-
tral bank law or the agreement between the central bank and the govern-
ment usually is stated so that inﬂation is expected to be held at the target. To
be sure, inﬂation targeting has not meant that countries have ignored out-
put ﬂuctuations. In many circumstances, especially in response to demand
shocks, no conﬂict exists between stabilizing inﬂation around its objective
and stabilizing output around potential. And some deviations from target,
of course, are inevitable and permitted; indeed, inﬂation targeting has be-
come more ﬂexible over time in many countries. But in practice, the pre-
sumption still is that the numerical goal will be hit consistently, with the bur-
den of proof on any deviations—and that presumption must be part of the
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3. In this regard, the Federal Reserve has been very clear on many occasions about its em-
phasis on achieving long-run price stability. For example, in his monetary policy testimony of
July 1992, Chairman Greenspan said, “As I have often noted to this committee, the most im-
portant contribution the Federal Reserve can make to encouraging the highest sustainable
growth the U.S. economy can deliver over time is to provide a backdrop of reasonably stable
prices on average for business and household decisionmaking” (Greenspan, 1992, 675–76).
Nearly every monetary policy testimony (and many reports) for the past ﬁfteen years contains
similar sentiments and reasoning. Consequently, I do not agree with Marvin’s characteriza-
tion of the Federal Reserve’s communication of the importance or priority it places on its
long-run price stability objective as “don’t ask, don’t tell”; the Federal Reserve has in fact been
telling the Congress and the public that price stability is its most important long-run respon-
sibility and intention.mind-set of the policymaker; in most inﬂation-targeting countries the peri-
odic reports of the central banks are called inﬂation reports, not inﬂation
and output variability reports. The attitude of policymakers is understand-
able. Inﬂation targeting is usually accompanied by elements of accounta-
bility linked directly to the inﬂation target—and to that target alone—and
that shapes much of the transparency associated with this framework.
The Federal Reserve is not an inﬂation targeter in the obvious sense that
it has not had an announced inﬂation target. Nonetheless, it is interesting
to ask whether the Federal Reserve has been an “implicit inﬂation tar-
geter,” as Marvin and others have asserted. That is, has Federal Reserve
policy been consistent with the second aspect of the deﬁnition above—a
priority for placing inﬂation at its “implicit” target and keeping it there? In
my judgment, it has not. This is clearest for policy between 1983 and the
mid-1990s, as Marvin acknowledges. Over this period, inﬂation remained
above most deﬁnitions of price stability, and the Federal Reserve was not
actively seeking to reduce it. This can be seen by the FOMC’s forecasts for
inﬂation reported in the semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Con-
gress, shown in ﬁgure 8C.1.Inﬂation forecasts for the subsequent year were
mostly at or above those for the current year, even though inﬂation was
running well in excess of any reasonable notion of price stability. An inﬂa-
tion-targeting central bank presumably would have been setting policy so
that inﬂation forecasts were moving toward the “implicit” price stability
target. The Federal Reserve leaned against potential upticks in inﬂation,
but it had no commitment to achieving price stability in a particular time
frame; the priority seemed to be on realizing “maximum sustainable
growth” as long as inﬂation was not rising from moderate levels.
Since the mid-1990s, inﬂation has been low and stable as measured by
the core PCE chain price index—within the range that Marvin has desig-
nated as price stability. However, the level and stability of core PCE inﬂa-
tion since 1997 are as much a consequence of unexpected developments 
as of deliberate policy choices. Importantly, the speedup in productivity
growth, even after it was detected, seemed to have greater disinﬂationary
force than anticipated; the broad-based strength of the dollar and the
weakness in global commodity prices that accompanied the East Asian cri-
sis that began in 1997 put substantial downward pressure on prices in the
United States, and, more recently, the recession and resulting output gap
have provided another unexpected source of disinﬂation. Notably, as can
be seen in ﬁgure 8C.1, in 1997, 1998, and 1999, the FOMC was projecting
an increase in inﬂation the following year from levels already to the high
side of Marvin’s implicit target.4 And in 2000 and 2001, the FOMC’s pro-
jections of total PCE inﬂation for the year ahead exceeded the 2 percent
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4. The level comparisons to Marvin’s target in those years are admittedly ambiguous. Un-
til 2000, the FOMC was projecting total Consumer Price Index (CPI) inﬂation, not core PCE
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Fig. 8C.1 FOMC forecasts from Monetary Policy Report
Notes: Measures shown are the midpoint of the range of the central tendency projections re-
ported in the Monetary Policy Report in July of each year. The solid line shows the forecast
for inﬂation in that calendar year; the dashed line shows the forecast made at that time for in-
ﬂation in the subsequent calendar year. The inﬂation variable is based on the GNP deﬂator
from 1983 to 1988, the CPI from 1989 to 1999, and the PCE chain-type price index after 1999.
upper end of Marvin’s range (see ﬁg. 8C.1). Still, the FOMC took no ac-
tion to bring inﬂation down; tightening from mid-1999 through mid-2000
was seen as necessary to forestall a sustained acceleration in prices. It was
not until July 2002 that the FOMC projected inﬂation to remain within the
range Marvin takes to be its implicit target.5
In addition, at a few key junctures in the past ﬁve years, the Federal Re-
serve exercised a more ﬂexible monetary policy than inﬂation targeting
probably would have suggested or allowed. The ﬁrst occurred in reaction
to the “seizing up” of ﬁnancial markets that followed the Russian debt de-
fault in the late summer of 1998. Although forecasts were marked down at
this time, the easing was faster and larger than would have been suggested
by Taylor-type rules based on our past pattern of behavior and incorpo-
rating an implicit inﬂation target. In eﬀect, to protect against the potential
for a really bad outcome for markets and economic activity, the policy-
makers raised the most likely outcome for inﬂation—or at least skewed the
risks toward the possibility that inﬂation would pick up. Similarly, in 2001,
5. Of course, the FOMC might have had higher (implicit) targets than Marvin is suggest-
ing, but a policy regime in which one cannot discern the implicit inﬂation target over several
years is probably not inﬂation targeting.easing was unusually aggressive, even before September 11, as the extent of
the demand shock gradually revealed itself. To be sure, when one looks
back, the outcomes in both instances in terms of stable inﬂation were not
any diﬀerent from what inﬂation targeting would have sought. At issue,
however, is whether the FOMC would have responded so aggressively to
these shocks if it had been constrained by an inﬂation target. It is a matter
of how the central bank is likely to weigh the risks and rewards of various
courses of action—where it takes its chances. My sense is that, given the
stress on hitting inﬂation objectives, the pressures of an inﬂation target
would have constrained ﬂexibility that in the end turned out to be useful.
Marvin argues that such ﬂexibility is not critical. His argument is that,
in an RBC model with ﬂexible wages, policymakers face no trade-oﬀ be-
tween stabilizing inﬂation and the output gap, which obviously bolsters the
case for inﬂation targeting. Unfortunately, though, in thinking about ap-
propriate policy frameworks, we have to leave the comfort of his model for
the real world. I think it would be naïve to assume that circumstances
would not arise in which the central bank faced short-term choices be-
tween inﬂation stability and economic or ﬁnancial stability.
The U.S. Economy Has Realized the Beneﬁts of Inﬂation Targeting for
Anchoring Inﬂation and Inﬂation Expectations without Its Constraints.
Inﬂation targeting would beneﬁt the United States if it would help tie
down inﬂation expectations or reduce errors in private-sector inﬂation
forecasts. The former would give the central bank more scope to lean
against economic imbalances and result in a more favorable trade-oﬀ be-
tween changes in inﬂation and in the output gap than otherwise. Better
forecasts would produce more eﬃcient allocation of resources as private
agents made decisions about spending and saving, and it would reduce ar-
bitrary redistributions of wealth from inﬂation surprises.
In general, however, the empirical evidence does not support a conclu-
sion that shifting to inﬂation targeting would produce such beneﬁts for the
United States.6 In some countries, the adoption of inﬂation targeting (and
the granting of central bank independence, which often occurs at the same
time) has helped to reduce inﬂation expectations. But the countries that
have taken this step are often those with a history of high and variable in-
ﬂation, and it has tended to bring their inﬂation experience more closely
into line with other countries. Since the late 1970s, inﬂation and inﬂation
expectations have come down in inﬂation-targeting and non-inﬂation-
targeting countries alike. Studies do not tend to show that inﬂation-
targeting countries have gained an advantage relative to other countries in
anchoring inﬂation expectations and reducing sacriﬁce ratios or in reduc-
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6. See, for example, Bernanke et al. (1999) and Ball and Sheridan (chap. 6 in this volume).
All empirical work on this subject is handicapped by the relatively recent advent of inﬂation
targeting and, as a consequence, the paucity of episodes in which to diﬀerentiate behaviors in
targeting and nontargeting economies.ing the variance of inﬂation-forecast errors. Apparently, credibility and
predictability ﬂow primarily from achieving low inﬂation, not from the
presence of an announced target. As a consequence, inﬂation expectations
seem to be as well anchored and as accurate in the United States as they are
in inﬂation-targeting countries, despite the absence of a numerical inﬂation
target or speciﬁcation of “price stability” here.
To investigate further whether inﬂation targeting helps tie down longer-
term inﬂation expectations, I took a closer look at the sensitivity of some
measures of such expectations to economic developments in the United
States and several other countries. One such proxy is the survey by Consen-
sus Economics, which records the forecasts of economists and other market
commentators over various horizons. To measure how ﬁrmly long-term in-
ﬂation expectations are held, I looked at the extent to which long-term fore-
casts react to changes in short-term forecasts. The three columns of table
8C.1give the variation in short- and long-term forecasts and the ratio of the
two. Column (2) clearly shows that long-term forecasts have varied no
more—and perhaps slightly less—in the United States than in inﬂation-
targeting countries, and column (3) indicates that they are also no more sen-
sitive to variations in short-term forecasts in the United States. Apparently,
long-term inﬂation expectations are as well anchored against short-term in-
ﬂation variations in the United States as in inﬂation-targeting countries;
variations in short-term inﬂation forecasts do not appear to pass through to
long-term forecasts in any of these countries, whatever the policy regime.
Figure 8C.2shows another proxy for changes in inﬂation expectations—
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Table 8C.1 Variation in inﬂation expectations (in hundredths of percentage points)
Average absolute   e
Current year 5 to 10 years ahead Ratio (2)/(1)
(1) (2) (3)
United States
1990–1995 45 10 0.22
1996–2002 39 9 0.24
United Kingdom
1990–1995 98 20 0.21
1996–2002 21 15 0.70
Canada
1990–1995 88 23 0.26
1996–2002 47 15 0.32
Germany
1990–1995 33 10 0.31
1996–2002 36 13 0.35
Sweden
1990–1995 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1996–2002 51 15 0.29
Notes: Table reports semiannual survey measures of inﬂation expectations from Consensus




























































































































































































































































)movements in long-term forward rates derived from the government secu-
rities yield curve. These are of particular interest since they are related to
the “inﬂation scares” identiﬁed by Marvin, which he deﬁned by sizable in-
creases in long-term interest rates. However, long-term rates are inﬂuenced
to some extent by anticipated near-term movements in short-term rates,
which may not be related to longer-term inﬂation expectations, and so the
use of a long-term forward rate in this context is preferred. Even so, these
rates, like those used by Marvin, can vary with changes in longer-term ex-
pected real rates, resulting for example from changes in the longer-term
prospects for ﬁscal policy or the trend rate of growth in productivity. Thus,
these measures are, at best, a rough proxy of inﬂation expectations.7
Since 1990, long-term forward rates in the United States have risen sub-
stantially on two occasions—in 1994 and in 1999. Marvin identiﬁes the
former as an inﬂation scare but, for unexplained reasons, not the latter, al-
though the change in the forward rate is no smaller in the second case. In
1994, forward rates rose in all the countries shown. However, inﬂation tar-
geting was just beginning in Sweden and the United Kingdom and was not
well established or, arguably, credible.
In 1999, forward rates also rose in the United States in response to strong
economic growth and high levels of resource utilization. But they increased
as much in Canada and Sweden, both inﬂation targeters. The exception is
the United Kingdom, whose forward rates have been quite stable in recent
years. The behavior of forward rates in 2001 is also instructive. The Federal
Reserve eased aggressively—more so than other central banks and more
so than might have been expected based on its past pattern of actions.
Nonetheless, forward rates behaved similarly in all the countries shown.
Judging from this proxy, even without an explicit inﬂation target, the Fed-
eral Reserve could strongly counter a perceived demand shock without sig-
niﬁcant adverse consequences for expectations.
An Inﬂation-Targeting Framework Is Not Necessary 
to Lock In Low Inﬂation in the Future.
So far I have argued that inﬂation targeting would not simply replicate
existing policy practices, it would not buy credibility or clarity about future
inﬂation prospects, and it would likely reduce the ﬂexibility that has so im-
portantly contributed to the success of U.S. monetary policy. One could
still argue that inﬂation targeting might be worthwhile, though, if its added
constraints on central-bank actions were needed to forestall a tendency to
backslide toward higher inﬂation in the future. However, a number of fea-
tures in the policy environment in the United States already provide con-
siderable protection against such a development.
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7. This comparison is also handicapped by the paucity of countries for which yield curves
are suﬃciently detailed to derive forward rates.First, the importance of long-run price stability and its appropriateness
as an essential long-run goal of monetary policy are widely recognized and
acknowledged. Certainly, this objective for the central bank and the limits
of its ability to aﬀect long-term trends in income and employment are
agreed on within the academic and central-banking communities.
More important, the key role of price stability is also recognized and
supported by the public and its elected representatives. Price stability has
been a legislated long-term goal of the Federal Reserve since 1977; notably,
it was retained in 1978 when the Humphrey-Hawkins Act was passed, de-
spite that legislation’s overall emphasis on high employment. The contrast
between the economic diﬃculties of the 1970s and the successes of the
1980s and 1990s has probably contributed to public understanding and
support for low inﬂation. Even when politicians call for easier monetary
policy, they usually frame their recommendation in the context that such a
policy would still be consistent with keeping inﬂation low.
Second, the Federal Reserve Act has established an institutional struc-
ture for making monetary policy that militates against forgetting or ignor-
ing the lessons of theory and experience or the requirements of the law. Pol-
icy is made by a large and diverse committee within a central bank that has
substantial insulation from short-term political pressures. In addition, ow-
ing to the length of governors’ terms and the nature of the Reserve Bank
presidents’ positions, there has been considerable continuity in the makeup
of the FOMC over the years, which has been echoed on the staﬀ level as
well. To be sure, the FOMC has tended to operate by consensus under the
leadership of the chairman, who exerts a strong inﬂuence on the nature of
the consensus. But it is a committee, and deference to a new chairman is
not likely to be as strong as it has become for the existing chairman, given
his record of extraordinary judgment and success over the years. Indeed, a
leader whose recommendations seem to be leading to higher inﬂation
would be likely to lose inﬂuence rapidly.
Marvin foreshadows and supports his argument that inﬂation targeting
is needed to sustain good inﬂation performance across leadership shifts by
raising the possibility that the “inﬂation scare” of 1987 was linked to the
change in chairmen that year and emphasizing how long the subsequent
rise in inﬂation and inﬂation expectations took to unwind. Inﬂation and
inﬂation expectations did rise in 1987, reversing a decline in 1986. Oil and
import prices escalated rapidly, likely triggering memories of similar cir-
cumstances in the 1970s, and import prices were expected to continue to
increase for some time as the dollar corrected its earlier overvaluation. In
addition, strong demand was boosting capital and labor utilization rates
(see Council of Economic Advisors 1988, 26–28). Consequently, a number
of reasons existed for a rise in inﬂation expectations that were not linked to
the leadership change. Moreover, as Marvin notes, inﬂation expectations
had increased a few years earlier and were to do so again in 1989 and 1994,
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tion and inﬂation expectations was far smaller and less persistent in the late
1980s than Marvin implies. He cites a jump of more than 2 percentage
points from 1986 to 1990 in total PCE inﬂation, but this increase was
greatly inﬂuenced by movements in oil prices, which fell in 1986 and spiked
higher in 1990 because of the invasion of Kuwait. The acceleration in core
PCE inﬂation, the measure Marvin recommends be targeted, was one-
fourth as much—from 3.93 to 4.39 percent—from 1986 to 1990. The ten-
year CPI forecasts of Blue Chip respondents rose from 4 percent in 1986 to
4.5 percent in 1987 but by the beginning of 1990 had reversed that uptick.
Of course, erosion of the weight that the Federal Reserve has placed on
long-term price stability is not impossible and would have adverse conse-
quences for inﬂation and economic performance. Inﬂation targeting with
an explicit political mandate to give long-term price stability priority
would make erosion much less likely. But it is not very likely in any event,
and I would be hesitant to incur the constraints of inﬂation targeting until
they seemed more necessary.
Even If I Favored Inﬂation Targeting, I Still Would Have Serious
Reservations about the Way Marvin Seems to Propose It Be Implemented.
Marvin notes several levels on which the Federal Reserve could “make
inﬂation targeting explicit,” diﬀering by their speciﬁcity and whether they
would hold in the short run as well as in the long run. They range from de-
claring that inﬂation in the long run should never vary much on a sustained
basis from recent levels to announcing a speciﬁc numerical target range for
core PCE inﬂation of 1 to 2 percent and setting policy so that realized in-
ﬂation would be expected to remain in that range almost always.
To  implement explicit targeting, he argues that the Federal Reserve
could obtain “congressional acceptance” of a priority for low long-term
inﬂation by oﬀering in exchange to participate in policy forums that would
allow outside commentators to voice their opinions and interact with Fed-
eral Reserve oﬃcials. However, this trade is not likely to have great appeal
to congressional skeptics, since they already have the authority to get tes-
timony and analysis from outside observers and critics of monetary policy.
Indeed, such hearings used to be a regular feature in the weeks leading up
to semiannual monetary policy hearings.
More fundamental is the issue of “congressional acceptance.” Marvin
does not specify what he means by this, which is problematic because it
could encompass a variety of interactions between the central bank and
the legislature. In my view, because the Federal Reserve, appropriately, has
limited “goal independence,” it has little scope for announcing a numeri-
cal inﬂation target that would tend to constrain its actions without explicit
authorization and direction from new legislation.
The place of an independent central bank in a democratic society is
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central bank agrees to strive for the objectives it has been given by the
elected representatives. The Federal Reserve has already exercised consid-
erable discretion in interpreting its “dual mandate” of price stability and
maximum employment in ways it has made clear in its testimonies and re-
ports. In the absence of legislation, going appreciably further in the direc-
tion of prioritizing price stability, as would be implied by a numerical tar-
get that was expected to be achieved most of the time, would be potentially
damaging to the democratic balance and would risk a backlash. Congress
has had several opportunities over the past ﬁfteen years to consider bills
proposed by legislators to make price stability the primary goal of the Fed-
eral Reserve, and it has not passed them or even given them serious con-
sideration. This statement does not necessarily imply that Congress would
oppose such a step if it were asked again—especially if the Federal Reserve
were strongly behind the proposal. But it does reinforce the view that it
should be asked, and actions to adopt and give priority to numerical inﬂa-
tion targets should await explicit legislative authorization. Moreover, act-
ing without speciﬁc authorization would abrogate one of the important
advantages of inﬂation targeting as practiced in most countries—it re-
quires the elected representatives to discuss and reach a conclusion on just
what they can and should expect from the central bank.
This point does not mean that there are no steps the Federal Reserve
might consider taking within its current mandate to clarify its views on
price stability. One such step might be similar to the ﬁrst level in Marvin’s
list—discussing in a general way how recent inﬂation rates relate to the
central bank’s view of price stability. A more speciﬁc approach would be to
announce a numerical range of a particular index that might be expected
to prevail over the long run, but with no change in the Federal Reserve’s rel-
ative priorities on price stability and growth (see, e.g., Meyer 2001). To
avoid the constraints of inﬂation targeting, the Federal Reserve would need
to be clear that the range did not constitute a ﬁrm or presumptive target for
inﬂation over the short or intermediate term and that the range could
change in response to shifting assessments of the costs and beneﬁts of par-
ticular inﬂation rates, to improvements in measurement techniques, and to
readings from other price indexes that seemed to be conveying diﬀerent in-
formation about underlying price trends.
However, I have some concerns about even such a “soft” inﬂation target.
Placing any number on an inﬂation objective—however much it would be
surrounded with caveats—has the potential to constrain policy in some
circumstances in which it would not be desirable to do so. That is, the quan-
tiﬁcation itself might tend to create a presumption that deviations from the
long-run goal would need to be resisted more than would be consistent
with the policy ﬂexibility exercised over the past twenty years. And I would
be hesitant to proceed down this path without some kind of explicit con-
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its legislated goals had been changed, without its approval. If, partly as a
consequence, it demanded that the Federal Reserve also quantify “maxi-
mum employment” or “maximum sustainable growth” and give weight to
those speciﬁcations, policy could be adversely aﬀected. As we have seen so
graphically in the last several years, assessments of the level and growth of
potential GDP must be revised frequently, and of course these variables are
not under the control of the central bank. As I noted earlier, markets seem
no less certain of the path for inﬂation in the United States than in many of
those countries with numerical inﬂation targets, and so the gains from put-
ting numbers on “price stability” are likely to be limited.
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Discussion Summary
Laurence Meyer suggested as a framework for thinking about Good-
friend’s and Kohn’s positions a two-by-two matrix with implicit versus ex-
plicit numerical inﬂation target in the columns, and dual versus hierarchi-
cal mandate as rows. The common interpretation of inﬂation targeting
would thus be the bottom right element—an explicit inﬂation target with
a hierarchical mandate. Meyer had instead suggested in the past the upper
right element—an explicit inﬂation target with a dual mandate that would
preserve the ﬂexibility to respond to output ﬂuctuations as well. Kohn
seemed to suggest that this was impossible to do. 
Lars Svensson proposed that, even without announcing an inﬂation tar-
get, the Federal Reserve could publish inﬂation reports with inﬂation fore-
casts up to three years ahead, which would allow the public to infer what
rate of inﬂation it was aiming for.
Frederic Mishkin disagreed with the view that the Federal Reserve’s re-
sponse to events in 1998 and 2001 would have been diﬀerent had there been
an explicit inﬂation target. He suggested that in situations of this kind the
350 Marvin GoodfriendFed should mention in its statements deﬂationary risks instead of using
language related to economic weakness. His main concern was to ensure
that a nominal anchor was in place by the time that the current chairman
left oﬃce, but a unilateral announcement by the Federal Reserve of an in-
ﬂation target risked an undesirable reaction of Congress.
Mervyn King emphasized the responsibility of central banks to commu-
nicate to the wider public the importance of price stability as an objective
for monetary policy, and the constraints that this objective imposes on the
conduct of monetary policy. An argument for an inﬂation target was that
it made explicit these constraints.
Stephen Cecchetti suggested that policy making by committee such as
the FOMC would be improved by having agreed-upon objectives. Once
the objectives had been agreed upon, they should be communicated to the
public for both transparency and accountability. It was incumbent on
those who took exception to inﬂation targeting to produce alternative ob-
jectives.
John Berry questioned whether, given the approval in Congress of the
Fed’s conduct, there was any support in Congress for changing the Federal
Reserve’s objectives. Neither were recent administrations involving them-
selves in a debate about the objectives for monetary policy. He also sug-
gested that there was little support for an announced numerical target for
inﬂation within the FOMC.
Martin Feldstein pointed out that both Paul Volcker and Alan Green-
span had mentioned in public speeches practical deﬁnitions of price stabil-
ity, and that the inﬂation expectations derived from long-term interest
rates suggested that market participants believed the Fed was committed
to price stability in the long run.
Athanasios Orphanides expressed concern about the degree of ﬂexibility
inherent in the Fed’s current operating regime. He pointed out that Arthur
Burns had been a chairman with as excellent qualiﬁcations as the chairmen
after him, and yet mistakes were made that led to the great inﬂation. It was
therefore important to search for reﬁnements to the current procedures
that would prevent a repetition of past policy mistakes, and inﬂation tar-
geting might be such a reﬁnement.
Laurence Ball proposed to combine inﬂation targeting with the concern
for ﬂexibility expressed in Kohn’s comments by having an extended list of
caveats, such as ﬁnancial crises, similar to the current practice of the Re-
serve Bank of New Zealand, such that deviations from an inﬂation target
are admissible when speciﬁc events occur.
Bennett McCallum suggested exploring the possibility of explicit, but
not quantitative, targets, such as the deﬁnition of price stability used by
Alan Greenspan. Performance with respect to such a deﬁnition could be
measured by looking at long-term inﬂation expectations.
Ben Bernanke agreed with Meyer’s suggestion that a dual mandate was
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trol. He expressed concern with the lack of communication between the
Fed and the public, and he suggested that the Fed could use its resources
to provide more information to the public about its outlook for the econ-
omy.
In response to Kohn’s comments, Marvin Goodfriend argued that his
proposed policy forum would provide the Fed with ﬂexibility in the short
run through improved transparency and public understanding of its policy.
In response to Meyer, Goodfriend said that he did favor making the long-
run inﬂation target explicit and encouraging the Fed to target inﬂation
within the long-run range in the short run. But Goodfriend also favored al-
lowing the Fed to take employment into account in the short run if inﬂa-
tion is inside the long-run target range, and even if the Fed is trying to work
inﬂation back inside the range after a shock.
Donald Kohn emphasized that the large number of FOMC members
complicated communication with the public enormously. In response to
Ball’s suggestions, he expressed the view that caveats had a tendency of be-
ing ignored, so that the announced numerical target could well assume
more importance, and be perceived as more unqualiﬁed, than was in-
tended.
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